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Abstract:  As North Carolina becomes more enmeshed in the national and global economy, 
the local political context might reflect more extra-local ties.  Lobbying organizations in the 
state have significant ties to out-of-state firms, particularly those with offices in Washington, 
D.C.  Examining the structure of lobbying relationships in one state, North Carolina, in terms of 
both lobbyist-to-client relations and inter-lobbyist relations such as through common clients, 
this paper assesses the level of relations between local and out-of-state firms.  Using social 
network and standard statistical analysis as well as lobbying data from North Carolina, adjoining 
states, and federal lobbying data from the U.S. Senate, this project is not only focused on the 
state level but also on relations between local and national firms.  To the best of our 
knowledge, little research has explored the connections between special interests represented 
at both the national and state levels.  We find that a significant number of lobbying 
organizations engage in lobbying at the federal level as well as the state level.  Moreover, the 
structure of relations among lobbying organizations appear to exhibit a truncated scale-free 
distribution of ties in which a small number of organizations garner the majority of ties.  
Organizations that represent other organizations (as opposed to representing themselves) and 
that operate at the federal and state levels seem to be the critical nodes in terms of the 
structure of the overall network. 
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Introduction and Overview   
As North Carolina becomes more enmeshed in the national and global economy, the 
political context also might reflect more extra-local ties.  Lobbying organizations in Raleigh have 
significant ties to out-of-state firms, particularly those with offices in Washington, D.C., and 
some consolidation among lobbying firms in Raleigh has occurred recently.  Examining the 
structure of lobbying relationships in North Carolina in terms of both lobbyist-to-client relations 
and inter-lobbyist relations (such as through common clients), this project would assess the 
level of relations between local and out-of-state firms, particularly those active in Washington, 
D.C.  Using social network and standard statistical analysis, this project would connect different 
conceptions of political influence with the changing face of lobbying in North Carolina. 
While the ostensible topic concerns state and federal lobbying, this paper is also about time 
and structure.  If social network methods permit us to take a relational view of political life, 
then we have to ask questions such as: How did this structure of relations come about? What 
does it look like?  And more importantly, what does it mean for political activity?  In addressing 
these questions, we have to consider the role of time.  Relationships build over time as actors 
interact and develop trust, norms, and common perspectives. So in this paper, we are 
concerned with not just with presence or absence of relations between state-level and federal-
level lobbying, but also with the explanations and interpretations of such relations.   
This paper begins by providing a review of prior research, and the review has three foci. 
First, we begin by discussing the importance of studying political activity at the state and local 
level, particularly the interrelationships among interest groups across jurisdictions. Second, we 
summarize prior political work from a social network perspective, which provides a rationale for 
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examining politics from a relational perspective.  The review of prior literature provides a 
foundation for our arguments, which suggest that extra-local ties undergird the structure of 
relations among lobbying organizations.  After a discussion of the data sources and methods, 
we present our results. We conclude this paper by discussing future work and extensions as 
well as connecting this project to the concept of political influence. 
Prior Research   
The structure of political activity has been a focus of social scientists for at least a couple of 
decades (Laumann and Knoke 1987).  However, as Baumgartner and Leech (1998) noted, little 
work has been done at the state level.  This project is not only focused on the state level but 
also on relations between local and national firms.  To the best of our knowledge, little research 
has explored the connections between interest groups represented at both the national and 
state levels.   
Prior work has not found a great deal of nationalization in state interest group communities. 
Wolak, Newmark, McNoldy, Lowery, and Gray (2002) created a dataset of state-level lobbying 
registrations across all 50 states in 1997.  They found that while the lobbying techniques show 
some convergence, communities of special interest groups remain predominantly local.   
Similarly, de Figueiredo (2004) and Boehmke (2008) model the variations of state-level 
interest group activity.  In Boehmke’s (2008) study, he notes that states that permit direct 
initiatives have significantly larger interest group populations.  Evidence supports the proposed 
mechanism that state-level initiatives generate mobilization of previously dormant groups, 
which are usually local in nature.  This result might obtain because initiatives are typically state-
specific, they foster larger interest group communities that create openings for niche groups, 
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and as initiatives typically create groups with a short-term focus, higher rates of group exit 
create openings for new groups. 
Lowery and Gray (1996) have used a population ecology framework to measure and model 
the growth and development of interest group communities at the state level.  Two ideas from 
the population ecology literature are especially relevant: the density of interest group 
communities and the diversity of such communities.  
Lowery and Gray’s work also points the way to thinking about connecting micro-level 
processes (such as mobilization and lobbying techniques) with macro-level structures (such as 
group density).  Specifically, contextual factors from the community level may affect the 
behavior of policy entrepreneurs who would found an interest group organization or help form 
a coalition.  For example, an interest group might make use of multiple lobbying techniques 
when the interest group environment is crowded in order to stand out from the crowd of 
lobbyists and capture the attention of policymakers.  A lower density environment in a policy 
domain may also encourage new group formation when issues in that domain become salient 
or rise up the policy agenda. 
However, there is evidence that suggests significant linkages between the federal and state 
levels.  Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (2008) model how federal policy activity stimulates 
lobbying activity in the states, and their analysis finds that “strong linkages exist between 
federal policy activities and the subsequent activities of groups in the states” (2008: 13).  They 
document that the pathways that connect federal and state-level policy activity are many and 
distinct. For example, they find evidence that federal and state policy actors are responding 
contemporaneously and directly to ongoing events. They also find a substitution effect in which 
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congressional hearings in one year dampen or stimulate state lobbying registrations in another 
year, the effect of dampening or stimulation depending both on the kind of state legislature 
and policy area.  However, the “precise mechanisms and timing associated with these factors 
should be the object of further research” (2008: 13). 
In this project, we wish to bridge the prior research discussed above to an entirely separate 
literature on social networks that provides a relational perspective.  A relational perspective 
stressing social network analysis may be useful in getting at social reality in “dynamic, 
continuous, and processual terms” (Emirbayer 1997: 281).
1
  Social network theory and analysis 
has a long tradition in political research.  For example, the resource mobilization approach uses 
the patterned links among interest groups to show the structure coalitions, cleavages, and 
competitive relations among such groups and how political actors are linked to resources 
(Laumann and Knoke 1987; Wellman 1988; Knoke 1990).   
The embeddedness perspective in network analysis “stresses the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust and discouraging 
malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985: 490).  “’Embeddedness’ refers to the fact that economic 
action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are affected by actors’ dyadic (pair-
wise) relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations.”  (Granovetter 1992: 
34).  In terms of dyadic or relational embeddedness, reciprocating ties are generally 
asymmetric, differing in content and intensity, but ties are usually reciprocated in a generalized 
                                                          
1
 “Instead of society, I thus use the term relational setting….As such, it is a relational matrix, similar to a social 
network” (Somers 1994: 72). 
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way (Wellman 1988).  Ties link network members indirectly as well as directly such that any tie 
between two actors must be defined within the context of the overall network.
2
   
Relational embeddedness typically has direct effects on individual action and leads to trust.  
Information from a trusted source is cheaper, richer, more detailed, and known to be accurate 
precisely because continuing relations often become overlaid with social content that carries 
strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism (Granovetter 1985).  Embedded 
exchanges make expectations more predictable and reduce monitoring costs; ‘thick’ 
information exchange of tacit and proprietary know-how; and joint problem-solving 
arrangements that stress flexibility and feedback (Uzzi 1997).   
In contrast, structural embeddedness typically has more subtle and less direct effects on 
action.  Multiple independent paths that link pairs of structurally cohesive actors help 
information flow among organizations in a way that facilitates politically similar activity (Moody 
and White 2003).
3
  Structural embeddedness, which arises from sharing one or more foci of 
activity with others, is less under the control of individuals and is more stable than the dyad 
(Feld 1997). 
Building on these different theoretical threads, we argue that a policy community is 
characterized by durable and informal relationships of the participating lobbying organizations, 
but the strength of the relationship is a property of the group rather than the constituent 
organizations (Moody and White 2003).  Lobbying organizations will vary in terms of their 
                                                          
2
 “In practice, many ties are with network members whom one does not like and with whom one would not 
voluntarily form a twosome.  Such ties are involuntary in that they come as part of the network membership 
package” (Wellman 1988: 41). 
3
 “In saying this I draw on the principle that to the extent that a dyad’s mutual contacts are connected to one 
another, there is more efficient information spread about what members of the pair are doing, and thus better 
ability to shape that behavior.  Such cohesive groups are better not only at spreading information, but also at 
generating normative, symbolic, and cultural structures that affect our behavior” (Granovetter 1992: 35).   
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specific strength of ties to each other, but the group has a unique level of cohesion that should 
persist over time.   
Moreover, relationships arise out of shared interests such that an increasing number of 
shared interests contributing to an increasing level of group-wide relationships.  Markovsky and 
Lawler (1994) identify ‘reachability’ as an essential idea to group embeddedness, that is, we 
should be able to trace a path from any group member to any other member.  As new relations 
develop out of shared interests, multiple and independent paths between two lobbyists can be 
traced through the group (Moody and White 2003).   
Multiplicity of ties might be expressed in terms of the number of issues or they might 
consist of different kinds of relations.  These relations can be shared issues, common 
membership in a trade association, jointly participating in a coalition, and a host of other social 
actions.  The point is that as a group becomes more close-knit in nature, ties or relations 
expand along different dimensions. 
But multiplicity of relations might only exist at only one point in time:  For example, 
lobbyists might come together once, and only once, to discuss five legislative areas of interest, 
and then depart.  Therefore, time also becomes part of the equation.  When we see the same 
lobbyists working on a number of shared issues over time, we could say that they are occupy a 
set of positions within a web of close-knit relationships.  Therefore, I would expect that those 
lobbyists who operate in one policy area over time would increasingly develop a stable set of 
shared interests with other, similarly situated lobbyists relative to lobbyists who do not work 




We build on prior research just discussed to consider three foci with respect to state-level 
lobbying.  First, while much prior work has considered the overlap of interest groups among 
states, we are also interested in the overlap in interest group activity between the federal and 
state levels of government.  Despite prior work on inter-state overlap among interest groups, 
we might expect a higher level of overlap between state and federal levels than among 
individual states for at least a couple of reasons.  Law firms are consolidating and extending 
their reach across the nation and, indeed, across the world (Warf 2001).  If this is the case, it is 
possible that substantive interests remain distinctly local while the practice of interest group 
representation becomes increasingly extra-local.  In addition, substantive interest groups may 
be predominantly local or regional in nature but these groups might operate collectively at the 
federal level. Thus, while North Carolina and Virginia may not have much overlap in terms of 
substantive interests, each of these interests is operating concurrently at the federal level as 
well as in the respective state.  This speaks to a multilevel of focus of activity within each state 
but not across state borders.  
A second focus of this paper is on the topology of the interest group space at the state level 
and possible connections between this particular topology and federal-level representation.  
Just a cursory examination of the state-level data for this paper suggests a scale-free network in 
which certain lobbying firms, individual lobbyists, and principals hold the bulk of relationships.  
If this is indeed the case, what accounts for this distribution?  If a new principal is seeking 
representation, for example, what kind of lobbying organization would it like to hire?  One 
possible explanation (just to take the case of lobbying organizations) is that certain local firms 
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have over time built up a level of expertise over policy and process, a certain reputation for 
influence, and a number of clients or principals that affirm the reputations for expertise and 
influence.  As noted in other fields, when status and reputation strongly influence the choices 
of relationships, scale-free networks are likely to form (Pollock 2004; Aldrich and Kim 2007).  
Another possible explanation is that lobbying firms that operate at both the federal and state 
levels may have greater resources than purely local lobbying firms, and a greater level of 
resources may enable more effective lobbying techniques.  National lobbying firms also may 
have a greater supply of clients from which to generate business at the state level.  In either 
case, we expect that principals that are seeking representation will hire the lobbying 
organization that has the greatest level of existing resources/reputation/ties such that lobbying 
organizations with more pre-existing ties to principals are more likely to attract new clients 
(subject to capacity).  In social network terms, we expect a process of preferential attachment.  
Our argument here is that while state interest group communities remain parochial (Wolak et 
al. 2002), a growing role for nationally-focused organizations can be found if we consider the 
structure of relationships within an interest group community. 
Finally, a third focus for this project is the question of community.  Can we characterize the 
particular shape and distribution of relationships as a community?  If so, what does that mean 
for the practice of politics at the state level? Prior work by Gray and Lowery (1996) discusses 
community in terms of density and diversity of interests, but this project centers the discussion 
of community on the idea of relationships.  Under our perspective, relationships that are 
durable lead to community stability.  Durable relationships within a community enable 
enhanced information flow among community members and an increased likelihood of joint 
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and coordinated activity.  How does this process work?  Durable relationships within a 
community arise out of continued interaction over time and reputation for effectiveness.  
Those interest groups that are present more often and have more multilevel interests are more 
likely to provide the foundation for durable relationships.  We argue that a network of durable 
and dense relationships undergirds a community of interest groups at the state level.
4
  
Data and Methods 
Conceptual Approach:  This project proposes to use multiple methods and data sources in 
performing the research.  Because our focus is on relations within a community of policy actors, 
we rely primarily on social network concepts and methods. However, statistical procedures are 
used to assess the significance of associations. The statistical procedures are both the standard 
statistical methods as well as a new modeling method for longitudinal network data.  In using 
multiple methods, we hope to provide as complete a picture of a state-level lobbying 
community as the limited data will allow.  
In addition, this study is multilevel in nature. We have data on principal organizations 
(organizations that hire or employ lobbyists), lobbying organizations (organizations that hire 
themselves to principals or that are self-representing), and individual lobbyists.  The long-term 
aim of this project is to assess the community of lobbying in North Carolina on each of these 
levels.  However, this version of the paper focuses primarily on lobbying organizations. 
                                                          
4
 A planned contribution of this project is a joint emphasis on interests and representation or lobbying. This project 
will explore the relationship between the spread of interests in a community and the nature of representation at 
the organizational level.  What connections might there be?  Gray and Lowery (1996) discuss niches in a 
community of interests, and we might think about niches in representation connected to niches in interests.  Thus, 
are lobbying relations stable, and if so, are stable relations connected to well-developed issue specialization?  Per 
Gray and Lowery (1996: 29), is ‘over-specialization’ associated with a lack of relations?  To answer these questions, 
we will be coding variables for types of interests, but we have not done so at this stage of the project. 
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Finally, we have collected data on organizations over time. Publicly available data from the 
state of North Carolina runs from 1993 to 2008 while federal level lobbying data spans 1999 
through 2008.  As noted above, this longitudinal data enables us to explore the durable quality 
of relationships within the community of lobbyists. 
Data:  In terms of data, our primary source is lobbyist registration data from the North 
Carolina Secretary of State.  Lobbyists – individuals and organizations – are required to register 
with the Secretary of State and file periodic reports.  Periodic reports must identify clients that 
hire lobbyists as well as the amount paid for lobbying services.  These reports are publicly 
available,
5
 but they do require data manipulation and recoding.  Reports were downloaded for 
the following time periods: the two year periods of 1993-94; 1995-96; 1997-98; 1999-00; 2001-
02; 2003-04; 2005-06. Beginning in 2007, reporting requirements switched to annual reporting 
such that we have data for 2007 and 2008.
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In addition, this project used publicly available disclosure reports that were filed by lobbying 
organizations on an annual basis with the U.S. Congress over a ten-year period (1999-2008).
7
  
We collected reports only for registered lobbyists such that the study excludes organizations 
that are represented by registered lobbyists and do not have lobbyists themselves (what we in 
this paper are calling ‘principals’) or that are not required to register.
8
   
                                                          
5
 http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/lobbyists/thepage.aspx.  
6
 We understand that the time periods do not completely match up in terms of duration, and we hope to remedy 
this disjuncture in future iterations of the project. However, we do not believe that different durations detracts 
from the main points of this paper. 
7
 Lobbying for registration purposes is relatively narrow as it only includes informal contacts between lobbyists and 
policy makers (Furlong 1998).  Also, because of expenditure minimums, groups relying on volunteers, those active 
only for a short time, or those active on a single issue may not be required to register (Baumgartner and Leech 
2000).   
8 The website for the federal lobbyist registration reports is http://sopr.senate.gov/. 
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Variables:  Dependent variables are centered on participation and position within the 
lobbying community in North Carolina.  Aside from descriptive measures of the prevalence in 
North Carolina of lobbying organizations that lobby at the federal level, we use social network 
analysis to create variables indicating the position of organizations within the lobbying 
community.  One network-wide indicator is the presence of the ‘giant’ or main component.  
Because actors are not always connected to every other actor in a network, we often observe 
several clusters or components of connected actors.  In this analysis, we focus on the largest or 
main component of connected lobbying firms.  In our descriptive analysis, we will be looking 
these main components. 
A second set of dependent variables touch on how central is an actor in the network.  We 
use three measures, degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweeness centrality.  Degree 
centrality for this paper is the number of ties to an actor divided by the maximum number of 
possible ties (this referred to as normalized degree centrality).  Closeness centrality is 
calculated for each actor by looking at how ‘far’ that actor is from everybody else in the 
network.  The farness of an actor is the sum of the lengths of the ties to every other actor.  The 
reciprocal of this farness measure is closeness centrality.  The normalized closeness centrality of 
an actor is the reciprocal of farness divided by the minimum possible farness expressed as a 
percentage.  Betweeness centrality captures the number of paths passing through a particular 
actor.  Specifically, betweeness is therefore a measure of the number of times an actor 
occupies a particular path that connects two other actors.
9
   
                                                          
9
 “The normalized betweenness centrality is the betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness 
expressed as a percentage” (Borgatti, Everrett, and Freeman 2002).  
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In terms of key explanatory variables, we code lobbying firms according to lobbying activity 
at the federal level.  To determine this, we employed some rules.  Trade or membership 
organizations that were state-wide chapters but which has a national-level body would count as 
lobbying at the federal level if the national body was registered at the federal level.  For 
example, AARP and the North Carolina Medical Society lobby in North Carolina, but their 
national-level counterparts (AARP and the American Medical Association, respectively) have a 
presence in Washington. Therefore, AARP-NC and the North Carolina Medical Society are coded 
as being active at the federal level.  A sub-state affiliate (e.g., the City of Charlotte Chamber of 
Commerce) would not be coded as lobbying at the federal level despite the existence of a 
national level entity (e.g., the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
We also include attributes of the organization.  In particular, two explanatory variables are 
counts of the number of years that an organization is active in both North Carolina and 
Washington, D.C.  A variable for ‘for-hire’ status is also used.  For-hire status is indicated for any 
time period when a lobbying organization is representing another organization.   
Methods:   Our plan of analysis covers several steps.  We first provide descriptive statistics 
for the community of lobbying organizations in North Carolina and correlations between key 
variables.  We then provide results from social network analysis that gives an exposition of the 
power law properties, if any, of the different levels of actors. 
In addition, social network analysis will be used to create some of the variables of interest, 
as discussed above.  Social network analysis will also be used to illustrate the pattern of 
relations among lobbyists, among principals, and the structure of geographic locations of 
lobbying firms.   
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For the modeling of longitudinal social network data, we use the actor-oriented statistical 
network model as expressed in the software program SIENA, which was developed to describe 
and explain the development of closed networks over time (Snijders, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005; 
Snijders & Van Duijn, 1997).  The model describes the development of a social network through 
time as a result of the rational actions of individual actors. Given the restrictions determined by 
the structure of the network and the distribution of actor and dyadic attributes, the model 
assumes that actors maximize their individual utility. The models combine random utility 
models, continuous time Markov models, and simulation (Snijders, 1995).  
We have as data a number of adjacency matrices, called Lij(t), in which cell (ij) stands for the 
existence of tie between ego i and alter j; ego and alter either have a relationship or they have 
not, and (t) denotes the moment in time the collaboration network is observed (in this paper 
there are three periods of observation). Actors i and j are in a range from 1 to n (in our case, n = 
678 lobbying organizations that are involved in common principal relationships with each 
other). The individual attributes (i.e., total number of years lobbying in North Carolina, total 
years lobbying in Washington, and for-hire status) are constant over time.
10
 
Each actor maximizes a utility function based on substantive arguments and constructed 
such that it represents the costs and rewards for an actor to be in a specific state at a certain 
moment in time.  Because the individual utility functions include elements that are not 
represented in the model by measured variables, this is modeled as a random component. 
Therefore, the utility function contains statistical parameters that have to be estimated from 
real observed data.  
                                                          
10
 Covariates may be time-dependent, but we have not finished coding these variables as of the writing of this 
version of the paper. 
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For each actor, a set of admissible actions is defined. These actions may refer to relations 
with the others in the network. In our case, lobbying organizations may start, consolidate, or 
dissolve an affiliation through a principal with all potential lobbying organization partners. The 
actors choose their actions according to a random utility model in which the actor chooses 
among the possible actions with probabilities that are an increasing function of the expected 
utility as calculated from the variables in the model. These types of models are called discrete 
choice models.  Discrete choice models are models for situations in which the dependent 
variable is a discrete set of choices, such as, in our case, whether to affiliate with a lobbying 
organization. In general, the choice of action for actor i at time = t, ait, from a set of allowed 
actions A, is based on a number of independent variables. If an action can be described as a 
function of one or more substantive utility arguments, it is assumed that the actor is able to 
determine the expected effects of future actions.  Therefore, each decision is associated with a 
change in utility, ΔUit(a). Because the choice of action can also be based on utility arguments 
that are not explicitly modeled in the utility function and because of measurement and/or 
specification errors, it is assumed that ego chooses the action that maximizes ΔUit(a) + Eit(a), in 
which Eit(a) is random error term.  Under certain conditions on the distribution of Eit(a), this 
leads to the model: 





This model states that, in case the expected change in utility is approximately the same for 
all actions, ego’s choice is more or less entirely based on pure chance. However, if, compared to 
other actions, one action is associated with a relatively large increase of expected utility, the 
probability that ego chooses this specific action is also relatively large.  
15 
 
The model contains unknown parameters that have to be estimated from observed data by 
a statistical procedure. Because of issues associated with the classical maximum likelihood 
estimation procedures and testing methods, Snijders (1996) proposed the method of moments 
and computer simulation. The procedure to analyze and to approximate expected values of 
relevant statistics, called theta (Θ), is based on the recursive Robbins-Monro stochastic 
approximation method and adapted by Snijders (2001).  Because this procedure provides the 
researcher with estimates of these statistics and its covariance matrix, a test can be applied 
using 
 
t = Θ-hatj/S.E.( Θ-hatj) 
 
in which the standard error (S.E.) can directly be obtained from the covariance matrix of the 
thetas. Snijders (1996, 2005) proposed to use an approximate standard normal distribution. 
In summary, we observe the affiliation network of lobbying organizations and collect 
information regarding a number of fixed and changeable individual and dyadic attributes. 
However, because we have no information about what happens, we simulate what happens in 
between the measurement points using the random utility model. The organizational actions 




Results   
General Description of North Carolina Lobbying: We first provide some numerical and 
graphical representations of the networks of lobbying firms and hiring principals in North 
                                                          
11
 The software that is used for the estimation is called SIENA, which is part of the network software package 
STOCNET and can be downloaded for free from http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/siena.html.  
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Carolina.  In terms of numbers, our data includes 2,624 organizations that lobbied or were 
represented by lobbying organizations in North Carolina over the 1993 through 2008 time 
period.  Of these, 2,292 were principals, and 1,129 were lobbying organizations.  The reason 
that the number of principals and the number of lobbying organizations collectively are larger 
than for the entire dataset is that many organizations have, at one time or another, been both 
principals and lobbying organizations.  In total, 797 organizations have been in both categories 
(although not necessarily at the same time). 
Of the 1,129 North Carolina lobbying organizations, 339 entities also lobbied at the federal 
level from 1999 through 2008.  The number of North Carolina organizations that lobby at the 
federal is relatively consistent on a year to year basis.  In 1999, the number was 277 but by 
2007 the number of North Carolina organizations lobbying in Washington reached 299.  Figure 
1 below provides a year-by-year picture of the number of lobbying organizations total in North 
Carolina, the organizations active at the federal level, and the percentage of North Carolina 




Figure 1: Number of Lobbying Organizations in North Carolina Only and in North Carolina and 
Washington, D.C., by Time Period (frequency and percent)(1993-2008) 
 
 
In Figure 1 above, the solid purple line indicates the total number of organizations that are 
registered as either lobbying organizations or principals.  In 1993-94, the total number of 
organizations registered was 735, but this increased to over 900 by the mid-2000s.  In addition, 
the total number of lobbying organizations (the blue line with square markers) shows a slight 
upward trend over time, but there is quite a bit of variation from one time period to another.  
The lower (red dotted) trend line is for the number of North Carolina lobbying organizations 
that also lobby in Washington, D.C., and this line also shows a slight upward trend over the 
1999 to 2008 time period.  The topmost line (green with triangles) illustrates the percentage of 
Total Lobbying Orgs - NC Only 
Total NC Lobbying Orgs in DC 
Pct NC Firms Lobbying in DC 
Total Organizations (Lobbying Organizations and Principals) 
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North Carolina firms that are also active at the federal level, and this line is upward sloping as 
the number of federal lobbying organizations is increasing when the overall number of lobbying 
organizations is decreasing.  The percentage of organizations lobbying at both levels of 
government was in the low 30s, but this figure approached 40 percent in 2008.  Of course, we 
cannot say what issues are driving this trend, and we do not have access to data for years prior 
to 1999.  However, multilevel lobbying in North Carolina appears significant.  But how does 
multilevel lobbying fit into the structure of the North Carolina interest group community? 
To answer this question, we first consider the role of time.  Figures 2 shows the distribution 
of lobbying organizations across all time periods in North Carolina, and Figure 3 provides the 
same distribution for lobbying organizations active in Washington, D.C.  For organizations in 
North Carolina, the distribution reflects a large number of organizations that are active for a 
short period of time but with a significant number of groups that operate across all time 
periods.  In contrast, organizations that lobby in Washington generally work consistently if they 




Figure 2: Number of Lobbying Organizations by Number of Time Periods Represented in 
North Carolina (1993-2008)(n=1,129) 
 
 






Table 1 below provides a cross-tabulation of lobbying organizations in terms of the number 
of years spent lobbying in North Carolina versus Washington.  There are 915 organizations 
represented in this table because we are comparing similar time periods (1999 through 2008) 
so that we have data for both state and federal levels.
12
  What we can see from the distribution 
in the table is that organizations can be characterized generally as either repeat players or one-
shot players (Galanter 1974-75).  About two-thirds of the organizations have no Washington 
lobbying experience, and of these non-DC organizations, roughly half have little lobbying 
activity in North Carolina.  At the other end of the row, 12.5 percent of all organizations (or 114) 
were active in North Carolina in every time period but with no DC-level experience.  
Of those organizations that do lobby at the federal level, the majority are consistent 
players: 219 organizations or 23.9 percent of the total have lobbied in Washington throughout 
the entire period.  Perhaps most importantly, however, note that many long-term organizations 
in North Carolina are also long-term players in Washington as 12.6 percent (or 115) of all 
organizations active are consistently active at both the state and federal levels.  These are the 
repeat players, the organizations who can be counted on to not only lobby on particular issues 
but also monitor developments even when activity on their interests is low.  In summary, while 
there is a clear majority of lobbying organizations that do not work at the federal level, we see a 
significant minority of organizations that not only lobby in Washington but do it consistently.  
These organizations may be the core set of organizations that coordinate political activity 
between state and federal levels.  With these characteristics of the lobbying community in 
mind, we now consider the overall shape of the network. 
                                                          
12
 In other words, 214 organizations did not lobby after 1998. 
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Table 1: Tabulation of Time Periods Lobbying in DC and in North Carolina, in percentages 
(1999-2008)(n=915) 
  Time Periods in NC 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Time 
Periods 
 in DC 
0 19.8 14.3 8.9 6.6 4.8 12.5 66.9 
1 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.3 
2 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.3 2.2 
 3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.2 
 4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.9 2.2 
 5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.3 
 6 3.2 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.3 12.6 23.9 
 Total 25.9 18.1 12.2 9.1 7.5 27.1 100.0 
 
 
The Distribution of Lobbying Relationships and Power Laws:  The fact that North Carolina 
lobbying has a substantial minority that are ‘repeat players’ and a large number that are one-
shot players may translate into a particular distribution in the relationships among 
organizations.  In particular, we argue that the networks of the North Carolina interest group 
community can be characterized as a scale-free in which a small number of organizations have 
the majority of ties.  In order to show and understand that distribution, we first provide some 
graphical representations of lobbying relationships.  The figures and some subsequent statistics 
show that connected nature of lobbying relationships.  We then focus on the nature of degree 
distributions of for-hire lobbying organizations and then for lobbying organizations as a whole. 
Figures 4 through 9 below illustrate the nature of lobbying relations in North Carolina.   
Figure 4 is a directed network of the lobbying community in 2003-04 showing both principals 
and lobbying organizations. (In order to make the picture clearer, we removed the isolated 
organizations, that is, those organizations that were not tied to other organizations.)  An arrow 
leading from one organization to another indicates that the organization (principal) is 
represented by the other (lobbying organization) that is receiving the arrow point.  Red squares 
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indicate that an organization does not have a Washington presence while a blue square 
indicates that the organization lobbies in Washington.  Since all the isolated organizations are 
removed, Figure 4 is a giant component for 2003-04 – All the organizations are connected, 
however remotely, to each other.  Some organizations send out more ties (i.e., hire more 
lobbying organizations) than others, and some organizations receive more ties (i.e., are hired 
more) than others.  As is expected, there is an imbalance in the distribution of relationship ties. 
Figures 5 through 9 focus just on relations among lobbying organizations such that a tie 
between any two lobbying organizations represents a common principal.  Figure 5 shows the 
different components (coded by color), and as in Figure 4, the network has one very large 
component with a number of very small components.  Darker lines indicate the strength of ties 
between any two organizations in terms of the number of common principals.   
In Figure 6, the affiliation network is coded (as in Figure 4) by federal lobbying (in blue) and 
by for-hire status (triangle).  As in Figure 4, organizations that lobby in Washington are present 
throughout the network, including the smaller components and the isolated organizations 
shown on the left edge of the figure. 
In Figures 7 and 8 organizations have been re-sized in proportion to the length of time spent 
lobbying in North Carolina (for the red squares) and the length of time spent lobbying in 
Washington (for the blue squares), respectively.  This giant component is dominated by groups 
that tend to be consistently active politically.  This makes sense if we consider that relationships 
of representation seem more likely if an organization has a long-term presence in the political 
sphere.  However, we also see a number of long-term organizations outside of the main 
component in the smaller components and the isolates. 
23 
 
In Figure 9, the organizations are re-sized according to the number of years that an 
organization both operated on a for-hire basis and lobbied in Washington.  Looking at Figure 9, 
a relative handful of organizations have long-term experience representing other organizations 
in both North Carolina and Washington.  These blue triangles are also at the center of the main 
component, but for-hire lobbying organizations that do not operate at the federal level (as 
shown by red triangles) are also present in the center of the main component.   
24 
 






































The prior figures focused on the network of organizations for just one period, 2003-04, but 
is the 2002-04 network a representation that reflects all time periods?  First, we note that the 
presence of a giant component is not restricted to the 2003-04 time period.  Table 2 
summarizes the size of the giant component over time.  Generally 60 percent of organizations 
active in any particular year are members of the main or giant component. 
 
Table 2: Organizations in Main Network Componet, 1993-2008 (frequency and percent) 
Time Periods 
93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 03-04 05-06 07 08 
Number  of Orgs in 
Main Component 443 545 565 538 602 500 610 557 497 
All Organizations 735 827 888 831 868 827 972 974 887 
Pct in Main Component 60.3% 65.9% 63.6% 64.7% 69.4% 60.5% 62.8% 57.2% 56.0% 
 
 
What is holding these main components together?  In Figure 10 below, we show the 
average number of in-degrees for for-hire lobbying organizations over the entire time period of 
the data.  The general trend is of an increase in the average number of in-degrees held by these 
for-hire lobbying firms.  Through 1999-2000, the average number of in-coming ties from 
principals was relatively flat in the range of 5 to 6, but beginning in 2001, the average number 
of ties held by for-hire lobbying firms increases until it reaches 8.23 in 2008.  In other words, 








The foregoing discussion suggests a process of concentration occuring in the lobbying 
organization network (and other networks as well).  Such a concentration of ties in a small 
group of entities may indicate the presence of a scale-free network or a structure of ties that is 
characterized by a power law distribution.  A power law distribution of ties is characterized by 
many organizations have few or no ties to others while a small minority have a large number of 
ties.  The network is therefore sparse in terms of its connections.  While there are different 
ways to check for power law distributions (see Barabasi et al. 2002), log-log plots of the 
distribution of ties (or degrees in network parlance) are often used to check for power law 
distributions.  If the general distribution of ties exhibits a fat right tail (e.g., many organizations 
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with little or no ties to othes with a minority of organizations holding many ties to others), we 
would expect power law distribution.  For example, Figure 11 gives the in-degree distribution 
for the 2003-04 network.   
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Transforming the general distribution to logarithmic scales should convert the fat tail to a 
linear relationship.  Figure 12 provides log-log plots for the incoming ties to all North Carolina 
lobbying organizations for all years as well as for the distribution of the sum of ties across all 
years.  Each graph has a scatter of dots for the actual distribution as well as a line that is fitted 
for the distribution.  Looking at the individual years, some distributions exhibit a better fit to 
the power law distribution than others (such as the graph for 2003-04, which was the example 
network in Figures 4 through 9 above).  However, all graphs exhibit, to a greater or lesser 
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degree, a power law distribution, and this is certainly true for the last graph, which is the sum 
of all in-coming ties across all years.   
However, note that in many of the graphs in Figure 12 that the ‘tail’ of the distribution does 
not follow the fitted line all the way down to the x axis but rather curves down.  The scale-free 
quality of the network is truncated even in cases in which the actual values fit very well to the 
line.  This indicates that the best linked organizations are not getting all the links.  Kogut, Urso, 
and Walker (2007), writing in the context of the venture capital industry, suggest that actors in 
a truncated scale-free network may tend to recreate prior ties rather than link to the most 
linked actors.  Given the importance of trust in lobbying relationships, it is perhaps not 
surprising, then, that prior relationships might act as a break on the development of a pure 
scale-free network in an interest group community. 
Why is characterizing the network of lobbying organizations as scale-free important?  Such 
a characeterization indicates a ‘winner-take-all’ quality to lobbying.  Certain organizations seem 
to garner the majority of business from principals.  As discussed in the conclusion, this has 
implications for the business of lobbying, representation, and influence.  But we first ask an 
intermediate question:  Are organizations that lobby at both the state and federal levels driving 

















The Effect of Multilevel Lobbying and Longitudinal Analysis:  To explore the effect of 
organizations that lobby at both the state and federal levels, we employ two analyses.  First, we 
examine differences in network position, specifically measures of centrality, through the use of 
t-tests.  Table 3 below provides a summary of t-tests for measures of network centrality for 
three groups: For-hire lobbying organizations, lobbying organizations that lobby at the federal 
level, and organizations that are both for-hire and lobby at the federal level.
13
  We check for 
differences in group means across centrality measures of degree centrality, betweeness 
centrality, and closeness centrality. 
In general, we find statistically significant differences across all groups and measures.  For-
hire lobbying organizations (the third column) have significantly hire measures for degree and 
betweeness centralities, but the results for closeness centrality show little if any difference.  
Groups that lobby in Washington show uniformly higher scores across all three centrality 
measures.  Groups that are for-hire organizations and that lobby in Washington show strong 
and greater differences for degree centrality and betweeness centrality but mixed results for 
closeness centrality.  For this last group, an interesting finding is that the differences for degree 
centrality and betweeness centrality are not only statistically significant but are increasing over 
time, which may reflect the results in Figure 10 above where for-hire lobbying organizations are 
showing an increase in average degrees over time. 
                                                          
13
 Full results are not reported here in order to conserve space, but they are available from the authors. 
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Table 3: Summary of T-tests for Network Position by For-Hire Status and Lobbying in DC 
Network 
Centrality Year For Hire DC Lobbying DC & For-Hire 
Degree 1993-94 0.1848*** 
1995-96 0.1905*** 
1997-98 0.1425*** 
1999-00 0.2005*** 0.0073*** 0.2356*** 
2001-02 0.2260*** 0.0107*** 0.3334*** 
2003-04 0.1805*** 0.0187*** 0.3272*** 
2005-06 0.2082*** 0.0232*** 0.3968*** 
2007 0.2176*** 0.0231*** 0.4699*** 
2008 0.1928*** 0.0189*** 0.4628*** 
 
Betweeness 1993-94 0.0709*** 
1995-96 0.0902*** 
1997-98 0.0745*** 
1999-00 0.0834*** 0.0088* 0.1048*** 
2001-02 0.1105*** 0.0135** 0.1955*** 
2003-04 0.0710*** 0.0145*** 0.1784*** 
2005-06 0.1115*** 0.2012*** 0.2427*** 
2007 0.1110*** 0.0280*** 0.2871*** 
2008 0.0971*** 0.0232*** 0.3327*** 
 
Closeness 1993-94 0.0002*** 
1995-96 0.0001 
1997-98 0.0008 
1999-00 0.0001 0.0010** - 0.00041 
2001-02 0.0011 0.0013*** 0.00178* 
2003-04 -0.0007 0.0017*** 0.00136* 
2005-06 -0.0002 0.0022*** 0.00184* 
2007 -0.0028 0.0019*** 0.00052 
2008 -0.0025 0.0018*** 0.00038 
 
 
To this point, we understand that networks of lobbying organizations appear to display a 
scale-free distribution, and it would appear that organizations active at the federal level and 
that represent others are more central in such networks.  In order to understand the dynamics 
of the network of lobbying organizations, we use a model for the evolution of the network and 
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evaluate the model using the SIENA software package.  Because of data and software 
limitations, this version of the paper provides preliminary results of the longitudinal model for 
the affiliation network of lobbying organizations for three time periods: 2003-04, 2005-06, and 
2007.  We use two network parameters – a popularity measure that is the square root of an 
organization’s degrees and a measure for triad membership in order to capture structural 
effects.  We include three actor covariates, which are years actively lobbying in North Carolina, 
years actively lobbying in Washington, D.C., and total years as a for-hire lobbying organization.   
Table 4 provides the number of transitions between time periods.  We see relatively few 
transitions given the size of the network, but this is because of the fact that many organizations 
are present for only one period and even then they are tied to other organizations.  Table 5 
below provides the results with models 1 through 4 successively adding parameters and model 
5 giving the full model.  In this limited and preliminary form, triads and degree popularity 
exhibit significantly positive results.  We can interpret these estimates as meaning that 
membership in a triad and the ‘popularity’ of an organization is likely to increase the likelihood 
of a tie for that organization from one time period to the next.  Similarly, more years spent 
lobbying in North Carolina and more years acting as a for-hire lobbying organization are likely to 
increase the likelihood of a tie for an organization.  However, Table 5 shows that more time 
spent lobbying at the federal level has little effect on increasing or decreasing the likelihood of 
a tie for an organization, but this result may reflect the fact that if an organization lobbies at all 
at the federal level, it is likely to lobby across all time periods.  A different specification for 




Table 4: Number of Changes Between Subsequent Observations 
Observed Period 0  0 0  1 1  0 1  1 
2003-04 to 2005-06 49,073 114 112 156 





Table 5: Results of Longitudinal Modeling of Lobbying Organization Affiliation Network, 2003-2007 (3 time periods)(n=678) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Parameters est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. 
Rate Parameter2003-04 to 2005-06 3.6020** 0.6437 3.8493** 0.4776 3.9119** 0.5070 3.8744** 0.6574 3.9348** 0.5015 
Rate Parameter2005-06 to 2007 2.6836** 0.2808 3.0695** 0.3673 2.2499** 0.2159 2.6734** 0.2820 2.9357** 0.3324 
 
Degree -6.5523** 0.1835 -8.4149** 0.5629 -6.5556** 0.1821 -6.7628** 0.1728 -8.1572** 0.4674 
Triads 1.0523** 0.0704 1.3961** 0.1015 1.0548** 0.0695 1.0879** 0.0655 1.3664** 0.0979 
Degree Popularity 0.6995** 0.0244 0.4916** 0.0177 0.6921** 0.0239 0.7035** 0.0212 0.4748** 0.0181 
 
Total Yrs in NC 1.0588** 0.2149 0.9484** 0.1788 
Total Yrs in DC 0.0111 0.0149 -0.0108   0.0104 




Discussion and Extensions  
 
This paper has shown some important features of the interest group community at the 
state level (at least for one state!).  The number of organizations with ties to both the state and 
federal levels is significant.  This is not to say that North Carolina is overrun with Washington 
law firms or that local politics and relations do not matter.  Indeed, we saw that a number of 
lobbying organizations that have a purely state-level focus are prominent in the network.  But it 
is fair to say that multilevel relations are not just present but constitute an important part of 
the network of lobbying organizations, particularly for those organizations that represent other 
organizations. 
But is the presence of organizations that have multilevel activities important for 
understanding the nature of the lobbying community?  In addressing that questions, we found 
that the network of lobbying organizations seems to exhibit scale-free properties at the state 
level.  That is, within the main component of the network in each time period, a small number 
of organizations hold a disproportionate number of ties to other organizations.  This finding 
seemed to appear in each time period. 
Finally, this paper provided evidence that supported the idea that for-hire lobbying 
organizations that are active at the federal level are key nodes in the lobbying network such 
that they seem to be important constituents of these scale-free networks.  Again, organizations 
with a purely local focus are important as well, but we think that a key link – but not the only 
link – in creating these scale-free networks are well-placed for-hire lobbying organizations, 
some of which are active at the federal level. 
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Why are these findings important?  We argue that they touch on the issue of influence in 
politics.  The issues of political power, access, and influence have been theoretical and 
empirical puzzles for quite some time (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961; Bachrach and Baratz 1962).  But 
despite the plethora of studies on lobbying, there are few conclusions about the nature and 
processes of influence (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 13).  A second problem (and probably a 
reason for the contradictory findings mentioned above) is that there is little or no agreement 
on exactly what is influence.  Is influence the ability to change the contents of a bill?  Is 
influence the power to change a legislator’s vote?  Evidence for any one conception is unclear 
and/or contradictory (Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Cigler 1991).  The difficulty associated with 
studying influence is that the underlying quality of influence is one of multidimensionality.  
Influence is a form of capital – Another term for influence might be political capital.  And like 
other forms of capital such as financial, human, and social, political capital or influence can be 
created from a variety of sources, stored, and then expended or used for a variety of other 
purposes.  Influence can be created from financial sources, expertise over an issue, credibility, 
and persuasiveness through interpersonal relations, to name a few.  Influence can then be 
applied to enhance the public visibility of a group, gain access to important meetings, engage in 
gossip, and help shape the content of policy products.  This study argues that social capital 
translates into political capital or influence.   
It might be better to view influence, at least in some political contexts, not so much as an 
input that creates a political output but rather as a signal (Spence 1976) or mark of status 
(Podolny 1993) within a political domain characterized by a set of relations.  A signal is usually 
defined as an indicator of quality that has two criteria:  the signal must be at least partially 
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manipulable by the actor and the difficulty of obtaining the indicator must be inversely related 
to the level of quality (Spence 1976).  Lobbying organizations have some control over their 
reputations, and a reputation for influence is more difficult to obtain if you are not a “player.”  
Status in turn can be defined in this context as the perceived quality or importance of that 
actor’s previous contributions to the development of policy (Podolny and Stuart 1995).   
In summary, we would expect political influence, using different measures, to be 
significantly related to those lobbying firms and individuals that are more centrally located in 
the local network of lobbying interests and that have stronger ties to national firms and 
organizations. 
There are a number of unfinished tasks associated with this project.  We intend to continue 
collecting data and coding additional variables that can augment the analysis presented here.  
For example, we would like better organizational and interest attributes.  Moreover, we will 
extend this work to principal organizations and individual lobbyists.  In addition, a goal of this 
project will be to continue to explore how the structure of relationships change over time.  
Finally, we intend to collect data from other states in order to see whether the findings in this 
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